Advocates of "living wage" laws claim these wage mandates will help families escape poverty by increasing family earnings beyond the poverty level. However, many families living with earnings below the poverty level take advantage of programs specifically designed to help them out of poverty such as Food Stamps, TANF, Section 8 housing and the EITC. We examine the interaction of these programs in addition to state, federal and payroll taxes for a variety of families and the effect a change in pay would have on taxes and benefits. We then apply our tax and benefit model to typical living wage levels in several cities where living wages have been enacted or considered. Using SIPP data, we identify families in these cities who would be eligible for living wages as well as information on what types of benefits they receive.
Introduction
The living wage movement has been successful in lobbying local governments to pass laws setting high minimum wages for companies doing business within their jurisdictions. More than 100 such laws have been passed since Baltimore passed its law in 1994. About two-thirds of these laws apply only to local government contractors. The remainder have a broader scope and cover businesses receiving any form of financial assistance from the local government, including tax abatements and low interest rate loans. More recently, living wage advocates have attempted to widen the applicability of such laws to cover all employers within a geographic area.
In 1998, academic activists Robert Pollin and Stephanie Luce published The
Living Wage: Building a Fair Economy, which has become a guide for living wage advocates to use in designing and evaluating living wage laws. In their book, Pollin and Luce are skeptical that attempts by local governments to create a business-friendly environment through tax abatements and other pro-business measures have helped poor families. Instead, they advocate imposing high minimum wages usually tied to the official government poverty line for a family of four, or some multiple thereof. This results in wage mandates for all workers who work in covered firms ranging from 150 to 250 percent of the current federal minimum wage, i.e. in the range of about $8.00 to $11.00 an hour. Frequently the laws provide separate wage mandate levels for firms that do or do not pay for health insurance for their workers.
The laws are designed to help the working poor. However, they are controversial because they raise the costs of doing business particularly for contractors and businesses that receive financial aid. This can lead to layoffs and businesses substituting higher skilled workers for those who have fewer skills. However, the advocates of living wage laws claim that such costs are small, and in any event they are worth it to help the working poor. This paper takes a fresh look at just how effective such laws can be for the working poor. There is much evidence that working poor families that participate in public assistance and subsidy programs such as cash welfare, Food Stamps, housing assistance, and Earned Income Tax Credits face very high marginal tax rates on additional earned income. These high rates, caused by a combination of payroll taxes and benefit reductions in public programs, operate in the very income ranges where living wage laws have their primary impact, e.g., $10,000 to $20,000. This raises a question about how effective an anti-poverty device living wage laws can be, even if we assume away their possible negative effects on low-skill employment and local economic growth.
In this paper we estimate how high marginal tax rates affect the ability of living wage laws to increase the disposable income of low-income families. We do this by looking at tax and benefit programs in place in seven cities Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco, estimating the program participation patterns among low-wage workers in those cities, and linking the programs to estimated marginal tax rates over the relevant wage ranges.
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on marginal tax rates and the poor. Section 3 discusses our approach and data sources. Section 4 provides estimates of the impact of high marginal tax rates on the effectiveness of living wage laws in reducing poverty rates and poverty gaps.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
Observations on the Literature
It is well known that the poor and near poor face high marginal tax rates because of their participation in government assistance programs that phase out their benefits as earnings rise. See Sammartino et al. (2002) ; Shaviro (1999) ; Acs et al. (1998) ; Giannarelli and Steuerle (1995) . The consequence of these high marginal tax rates for the ability of wage mandates such as those in minimum wage laws and living wage laws to raise family (after tax) income is less well understood. The focus of the prior literature on marginal tax rates and the low-income population has mostly been on the work incentive and distributional consequences of high marginal tax rates rather than their interaction with wage mandates. An exception is Shaviro (1999) , who comments that "a single mother of two, working full time (at the minimum wage) in a state that offers generous public assistance benefits, would retain only $52.42 of the extra earnings" associated with a rise in the minimum wage by one dollar.
1 He contrasts this with the outcome for a single working teenager or childless adult under the age of 25, who would take home approximately $1,554 from that same one dollar rise in the minimum wage.
Shaviro comments that because of high marginal tax rates, "arguably, those who need additional income the most receive the smallest "raise," while those who need less get much more."
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We know of no empirical estimates of the effect of high marginal tax rates on the ability of living wage laws to move working poor families out of poverty. The prior literature has focused primarily on the welfare population rather than the working poor, and as indicated above, has mostly ignored the implications of high marginal tax rates for wage mandates. However, the prior literature can provide us with a rough idea of how high marginal tax rates may be for families experiencing the types of wage increases mandated by living wage laws. In Table 2-1 and Table 2 -2, we summarize the marginal tax rates found in prior research averaged over an income range between the minimum wage and multiples of the minimum wage, and between the federal poverty line and multiples of the federal poverty line, respectively. We adjusted the reported figures in Sammartino et al. (2002) , Giannarelli and Steurle (1995) and Shaviro (1999) to be consistent with an assumption that the employer's share of Social Security taxes was not part of the earnings base.
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The results displayed in the tables indicate that the marginal tax rates facing lowincome families are quite high, particularly in an income range from the minimum wage up to 1.5 times the minimum wage, or from the poverty line to 1.5 times the poverty line (in some instances greater than 100 percent). The rates are particularly high when families participate in multiple transfer or tax subsidy programs. Thus, the prior literature suggests that such high marginal tax rates can certainly impair the effectiveness of living wage mandates to improve family economic well-being. This is so, even under the most favorable assumption that there is no employment displacement or reductions in hours as a consequence of the living wage law. Our analysis in this paper will build on this literature to examine more specifically the consequences of high marginal tax rates for the effectiveness of living wage laws considering the mix of families likely to be affected by such laws, and their participation in public transfer and tax subsidy programs.
Objectives and Approach
In this paper, we will investigate the significance of marginal tax rates for the We computed an (average) marginal tax rate (MTR) in 1999 for each sample household by the formula:
where the changes are measured between the household's observed baseline GE and CDI, and the GE and CDI associated with the living wage intervention. The MTR measures the fraction of the living wage-induced change in earnings that is kept by the household after taxes and benefits are considered. In Section 4, the computed MTRs are reported for different groups of households for each of the seven cities examined.
We then conducted an analysis of the impact of the MTRs on the effectiveness of living wage laws in reducing the amount and degree of poverty in the seven cities. We did this by using two different measures of poverty: one, based on gross earnings only, and the other based on comprehensive disposable income. We computed poverty for both income concepts using the federal poverty line (FPL) We examine overall program participation in of the households, the head had no reported earnings or hours in a given year, so it was not possible to compute his or her hourly wage rate. Approximately 21% of the household heads had an imputed hourly wage rate less than $10 per hour, and 54% had wage rates greater than $10 per hour. Almost 40% of the sample is unmarried, and nearly 20% had a non-working spouse. Working spouses who earned less than $10 per hour comprised 14% of the sample, while working spouse who earned more than $10 per hour comprised 29% of the sample. In our sample, approximately 9% live in poverty in a given year (based on gross income), and another 14% have family income under 200% of the poverty line.
In Table 4 .2, we break out welfare participation by family income, by showing participation rates for the "near poor" with incomes less than 200% of poverty. Clearly, the patterns of program participation are much more dramatic. More than half of poor and near-poor families participate in welfare. Of those who participate, about one-third only participate in Medicaid, and most of the remaining participate in multiple programs.
More than 13% of poor and near-poor households participate in Medicaid, AFDC/TANF, and Food Stamps, and more than 7% participate in Medicaid, AFDC/TANF, Food Stamps, and public housing. It is important to note that there are often long queues to enter public housing, so presumably some households who are not participating would participate if they could get in. Again, with the exception of Medicaid, participation in only one welfare program is not very common. Briefly examining the other rows, as one would suspect, the labor force participation rate is much lower for poor households, and conditional on work, the wage distribution is much lower. About 45% of poor households have a head with no earnings, and about 45% have a head who earns less than $10 per hour. Thus, this group is very likely to be affected by living wage laws, and has high participation rates in multiple welfare programs. The analysis is focused on each earner's total annual wages and the family's tax status (head of household, single, or married). 11 Program benefits for Food Stamps, TANF, Section 8 were calculated, as well as federal, state, and local taxes, and employment taxes (like Social Security and Medicare). All families' earnings, income, and marginal tax rates were modeled on their reported program participation and estimated welfare benefits. We assume that all households file a tax return and claim the standard deduction.
Simulating the Effects of the
Although few families receive all welfare benefits, as Section 4.1 suggests, many participate in one program or another during a given year. The cumulative marginal tax rate for each household was determined by adding the marginal tax rates for the programs in which the household participated. In all of the analysis that follows, we rely on a "nobehavioral response" assumption. In particular, we assume that hours worked and labor force participation are unaffected by the change in the wage rate. If the living wage has disemployment effects, the analysis below would overestimate the impact on moving out of poverty.
The Impact of the Living Wage on Poverty Rates
The first general question is does the living wage reduce poverty? In general, we use two different income bases for determining poverty rates: one base relies solely on the head's and spouse's earnings, and the second relies on CDI. CDI adds earnings, the EITC, and welfare benefits, and subtracts taxes. In-kind benefits are assumed to be worth the same as cash. An analysis that focuses only on earnings and ignores the tax rates from the tax and transfer system is akin to an analysis that assumes a 0% tax rate.
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 and Table 4 -3 examine the effects of the living wage on poverty rates using the SIPP (in the remaining sections, household weights are used).
Focusing on the figures, it is clear that the living wage is not well targeted on the poorthe overwhelming majority (72%) who benefit were not poor before the simulation. Of the 28% of households who were initially poor before the simulation, approximately onethird leave poverty.
It could be argued that even though most who were affected by the living wage were not poor, the total expenditure disproportionately benefits those below the poverty line. For example, if most of the non-poor in Figure 4 -1 had earners concentrated just below the $8.83 living wage, while most of the poor had earners concentrated near the minimum wage, then the bulk of the expenditure would be, in fact, well targeted. Figure   4 -2 shows that this is not the case -the non-poor receive a nearly identical amount (74%) of the expenditure. Although the initial non-poor likely have higher wage rates (which reduces the impact of the living wage), they also have higher annual hours of work (which increases the impact). Overall, the only striking difference between Figures 4-1 and 4-2 is that those who leave poverty receive a slightly higher proportion of the total expenditure, which suggests they work more hours than those who remain poor. Table   4 .3 shows several additional calculations. The reduction in poverty rates is 8.7
percentage points when tax rates from the tax-and-transfer system are ignored. As the third and fourth rows show, both the initial level and the reduction are smaller once these taxes are accounted for. The initial poverty rate, 17.6%, is almost 40% lower using CDI, and the reduction in poverty is 6.4 percentage points, only about three-quarters the impact that ignored tax rates.
The second set of rows examines an alternative measure -whether the family was "near-poor," having income under 200% of the poverty line. Strikingly, 41% of the sample was not "near-poor" even before the living wage increase, and our tabulations show that this group received 39% of the total expenditure from the living wage increase.
When we use CDI, a smaller proportion was above 200% of the poverty line, because most households are ineligible for welfare benefits around that level, and the taxes reduce a family's gross income to under this threshold. In both cases -using earnings alone (and assuming a 0% tax rate) or CDI (and assuming a realistic tax rate) -the reduction in "near-poor" poverty is around 6-7 percentage points. This suggests that the focus on marginal tax rates is less relevant for higher income thresholds, though important differences emerge around the poverty line.
4.4
The Impact of the Living Wage on Income The table also shows that families with children have higher earnings (reflecting, in part, higher marriage rates and higher ages of the head). These differences do not narrow with comprehensive income, reflecting the fact that many subsidies (welfare and EITC) are largely targeted toward families with children.
Finally, there are large differences in earnings across metropolitan areas (though the sample sizes for some regions are relatively small, so the medians may be imprecisely estimated). Interestingly, the inter-region differences shrink considerably when CDI is examined. (as well as subsidies from the EITC). This is reinforced by examining the last columnwhich assumes 100% program participation among eligible households. In this case, the MTR is 80%, but our analysis show that such a 100% takeup assumption is far from the truth.
MTRs neither vary much by full-time work status, nor by the presence of children. This can be explained for full-time work by the fact that many full-time workers are in the EITC phaseout range (with a tax rate of 21%), while part-time workers are often in the subsidy range (with a 40% subsidy) which offsets the high MTRs of welfare programs. Similarly, although families with children have higher participation in welfare programs (which adds to the cumulative MTR), they often get the EITC, which may reduce the MTR. Finally, the analysis shows that the median MTRs by metropolitan area do not vary much, but if 100% program takeup is assumed, there is considerably more variation.
The lack of regional variation is perhaps surprising, given the diversity of metropolitan areas in terms of their social safety net and state/local tax system. 
The Impact of the Living Wage on the Poverty Gap
The final three tables (Tables 4-6 , 4-7, and 4-8) combine the focus of changes in poverty rates and changes in income. The poverty ratio, defined in Table 4 -6 as the ratio of earnings and CDI to the family's poverty level, was approximately 1.6 before simulating the effects of the living wage. This means that a typical family in our sample had earnings nearly 60% higher than the poverty level before a wage increase. A number below 1.00 indicates that the median family in the sample was in poverty, such as those who received some welfare benefit.
It is expected that when giving all families a substantial wage increase (and ignoring disemployment effects) will yield substantial changes in earnings and CDI.
Comparing the third and sixth columns of Table 4 -6 shows there is a substantial difference when considering how typical families fare when considering the "Total Earnings Poverty Ratio" to the "Total Income Poverty Ratio." Although the initial levels are very similar for all families, the change is three times larger for earnings than CDI.
This again emphasizes the importance of the MTRs from the tax and transfer system.
Moving down the columns, one can observe that in almost all scenarios, the "true" change in well-being is overstated by ignoring MTRs. One might expect that for those on welfare (the third row) to have essentially zero change in their well being for CDI, but a large change for earnings. As it turns out, the change for earnings is about the same as non-welfare recipients, while the change in comprehensive income is indeed very small.
The reason that earnings do not change very much in column (3) is the small number of hours worked.
As illustrated in Figure 4 -1 and Table 4 -3, the living wage largely benefits those who are not initially poor. It is still useful, perhaps, to see whether conditional on being in poverty (or near poverty), does the living wage have much impact. The analysis in Tables 4-7 and 4-8 examines the "poverty gap" and the "near poverty gap." The poverty gap is defined for a family as the difference between their poverty line and actual earnings or income (and would be zero for families above poverty line). The sample in Table 4 -7 consists of those who were in poverty (based on earnings or comprehensive) before the living wage increase, while As the fourth and sixth columns show, the general conclusions about the effectiveness of the living wage depend critically on accounting for the tax-and-transfer system. The change in the poverty gap based on earnings is fairly substantial ($1,700) but is much smaller based on CDI ($750). These differences emerge by work status, family structure, and region. The robust finding from Table 4 -7 is that the impact of the living wage on true well-being is quite small for those in poverty. Finally, Table 4-8 recalculates these numbers for the "near-poverty" gap. The same kinds of conclusions emerge here. The "near-poverty" gap falls by $2,600 for all families based on earnings, but only $300 based on CDI. Again, the impact of the living wage on well-being appears to be quite modest for those who are worst off.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the consequences of implementing a living wage law on the economic status of affected households. Absent in the usual discussion about the impact of such living wage laws are the high cumulative marginal tax rates present in means-tested programs such as AFDC/TANF, Food Stamps, and public housing (and through the phase out of the EITC). These welfare programs disproportionately affect single parent households, but some programs are also available for married households with children and childless households.
The cumulative marginal tax rate, once these programs are included, is very high and over some income ranges exceeds 100%, which implies that the implementation of "living wage" laws may not improve the well being of the household. The analysis here focuses on several large metropolitan areas, most of which could be considered high cost of living. The results of living wage laws that apply to these MSAs are likely to apply to lower cost of living areas, too. AFDC/TANF is a state-level program, Food Stamps is national, while the income limits for public housing are almost always in the relevant range for the currently proposed living wage laws. We show that for many families, especially those who have low annual incomes or low hourly wage rates, welfare participation is quite common and multiple program participation is the rule, not the exception.
Although beyond the scope of the current study, there are several other relevant transfers that could be considered. We did not include Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which offers assistances to poor households with disabled adults or children. We also excluded energy assistance, which is means-tested and tends to vary at the local level. We also ignore child-care subsidies, school breakfast and lunch programs, and Head Start. All of these are means-tested as well, and for at least some of the families in the sample would increase the tax rates even more. Finally, it was beyond our scope to incorporate Medicaid (since it currently has income limits for many families that are well beyond those of proposed living wage laws). Over some parts of the budget constraint, the loss of Medicaid would produce an exorbitant marginal tax rate. See Yelowitz (1995); Yelowitz (2000) .
Proponents of living wage laws seem to be aware that the high tax rates make it difficult for such wage mandates to significantly increase family income. However, they argue that having a higher paying job leads to improvements in workers' self-esteem, and even productivity. However, such psychological benefits would seem to be a kind of psychic illusion, with the worker being blind to the regulatory manipulation of market wages. However, this illusion, if it exists, is not innocuous because workers may be led away from socially beneficial investments in education and training, and even geographic mobility, by their belief that their wages may remain high even without the additional human capital investment. Also, workers may learn to their dismay that they are trapped in living wage jobs that pay wages well above their next best alternatives outside the jurisdiction of the living wage laws. If society wants to improve the economic status of low-income families, it seems to us that the best way to do this is through targeted tax credits that go to families most in need, and do not trigger either additional taxes or losses in benefits from public programs.
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Our study suggests several directions for future research. First, our simulations suggest that the impact of living wage laws on family income should be very modest.
Given the phase-in of living wage laws from 1994 onward, it is possible to use panel data to assess the empirical impact on these laws on total income, and welfare income.
Second, eligibility, taxes, and benefits for welfare programs are most often determined monthly, while federal income taxes are determined annually. This opens up the possibility of "bunching" earnings into several months of the year and "bunching" welfare benefits into other months of the year. By doing so, a strategic household could avoid some of the high marginal tax rates because the earnings would be zero during the months the household was on welfare. Finally, our analysis suggests the incidence of the living wage should vary by family structure. Childless households tend to benefit the most from living wage laws because they are ineligible for most welfare benefits, while single parent households tend to benefit the least. Using the actual implementation of the laws, one can explore whether these predictions actually hold up.
Appendix A. Survey of Income and Program Participation Data Analysis
The SIPP analysis uses information from the 1996 panel, which follows a cohort of households from late 1995 through early 2000.
The SIPP contains basic demographic and social characteristics data for each member of the household. These include age, sex, race, ethnic origin, martial status, household relationship, education, and veteran status. Core questions, which are repeated each interview, cover labor force activity, types and amounts of income, and participation in various cash and noncash benefit programs for each month of the four-month reference period. Data for employed persons include number of hours and weeks worked, earnings, and weeks without a job. Core data also cover post-secondary school attendance, public or subsidized rental housing, low-income energy assistance, and school breakfast and lunch participation.
The sample in each wave consists of 4 rotation groups, each interviewed in a difference month. For Wave 1, the interview months are from February to May 1996.
For each group, the reference period for reporting labor force activity and income is the four calendar months preceding the interview month. Thus, the information for a household starts anywhere between October 1995 and January 1996.
The SIPP is a longitudinal survey where each sampled household and each descendent household is reinterviewed at 4-month intervals for 12 interview or "waves."
Unique codes are included on each record to allow linking together the same persons from the preceding and subsequent waves. From the 1996 panel, all "person-months" were obtained from all 12 waves. We then applied a number of screens. First, we defined the household head's age, MSA, and family structure in the December 1999 interview month. This is done because our analysis examines living wage changes in 1999, and the federal tax code defines a family unit as of December 31 of each year. One quarter of the SIPP sample had their last interview in November 1999, so the age, MSA, and family structure variables were taken from that month for them.
The sample initially consisted of 3,897,232 "person-months" on 44,047 households. We kept observations only from "living wage" MSAs (and our 'control' MSA). We therefore selected household heads who were initially living in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Baltimore, and New York City. We eliminated households that were not living in one of these MSAs as of December 1999, which reduces the sample to 3,851 households. Next, we kept households who had a head aged 15 to 64 (inclusive), which reduces the sample to 2,711 households (this screen largely eliminates households with elderly heads). Next, restricted the data to the calendar years 1996 to 1999, and kept observations on household head. The final sample consists of 129,791 "person-months" on 2,711 households.
Some of our tables divide the 2,711 households by the head's (and spouse's)
hourly wage rate or hours of work. In our data, we imputed an hourly wage rate for each person as follows. For each calendar year, we aggregated earnings and hours from the month to annual level, and then divided annual earnings by annual hours. The rules for TANF were obtained from state welfare offices and websites. The Food Stamp rules were taken chiefly from the USDA website http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/applicant_recipients/fs_Res_Ben_Elig.htm and 1999 benefit schedules and eligibility were obtained from http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/getinfo/acl99/99-71.PDF . We assumed that the shelter allowance was equal to HUD's fair market rent for the applicable area for the minimum size suggested by HUD. By these standards a single adult would not need any more than a single room, and families with children would live in homes with one bedroom for every two children, and one bedroom for parents (see the Housing Choice Voucher Program Guidebook at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/hcv/forms/guidebook.cfm). The fair market rents for Section 8 were obtained from Housing and Urban Development at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/il/fmr99/incfy1999.xls. 6 We limit the sample to individuals who in 1999 earn between the maximum of the federal or state minimum wage and the living wage standard of $8.83, and we exclude persons who report public benefits (TANF, Food Stamps or Section 8 Housing Assistance) but who appear to be statutorily ineligible. These screens reduce the SIPP sample to 420 households. 7 The wage of $8.83 is the median living wage standard from approximately 40 local jurisdictions that had passed such laws by the end of 1999. Our analysis will simulate the effect of a universal law that covers all workers within a particular MSA. This is a fair test of whether a living wage ordinance can affect poverty in a local area. The actual laws are generally thought to have too narrow coverage to have any significant effect on poverty. Moreover, examining a law based on universal coverage allows us to analyze effects for the cities in our sample that already had living wage laws in effect in 1999 (all but New York City) because our simulations greatly expand the coverage of such actual laws. 8 As household gross earnings increases, CDI changes by the amount of the earnings increase less the amount of additional taxes and less the amount of transfers lost. The slope of the schedule is the marginal tax rate, and the average slope over a particular range of earnings is the average marginal tax rate. 9 An affected worker is one whose reported wage was between the applicable state minimum wage and $8.83. An unaffected worker was one whose reported wage fell outside this range, or who reported no earnings. 10 We used federal and state tax schedules for 1999, assuming that all filers took the standard deduction.. Married couples were assumed to file jointly. Unmarried household heads with children under 18 were assumed to file as heads of households. All others were assumed to file as singles. Notes: Data taken from the 1996 SIPP. All data is unweighted. The welfare participation variables are aggregated from monthly to annual participation (meaning that a member of that household participated was in the program at some point during the year). The head's and spouse's hourly wage variable is constructed on an annual basis, and is based on SIPP questions referring to monthly gross wage and usual hours of work. The number of observations varies across year because some households that were formed in December 1999 (when the sample selection screens are applied) were not present in earlier years. Several households had unrelated families, and are treated as separate observations above. 
